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Abstract: Based on the Knowledge Production Function framework given by 
Griliches (1979), we slightly modify it so that the innovative output depends upon a 
set of factors related to the firm internal characteristics and are influenced by the 
environment. Specifically, regarding the firm internal determinants the effect of the 
concentration of the ownership, the composition of the boards of directors and the 
effect of the nature of the ownership (foreign and public) are analyzed. Additionally, 
in order to capture the determinants of the environment in which the firm operates 
other variables concerning the internationalization of market, the agglomeration 
economies and the regional knowledge externalities are also considered. In order to 
assess the impact of these determinants on the number of patents and models of use 
awarded by the firm, the discreteness of the latter variable has to be taken into 
account. We apply Poisson and Negative Binomial models for a more 
comprehensive evaluation of the hypothesis in a panel of Spanish manufacturing 
firms. The results show patenting activity is positively favoured by being located in 
an environment with a high innovative activity, due to the existence of knowledge 
spillovers and agglomeration economies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Knowledge Production Function (KPF) framework originally developed by Griliches 
(1979) has been widely used to analyse the relationship between firms’ R&D investment and 
patent applications, the latter seen as a relevant, although not perfect, measure of the 
technological effectiveness of R&D activities. This basic model was lately modified so that 
the increment of the innovative output depends upon a number of further factors related to the 
internal characteristics of the firms and environmental variables related with the market and 
the region where the firm is operating.  
The literature shows that a company’s ability to innovate depends on a series of factors, in 
such a way that whether or not they are present has a favourable or unfavourable influence on 
the innovation process. Among others, these factors may be placed in the following groups:  
1. The existence of favourable conditions in the demand structure or in market size, in 
the life cycle of the products the company manufactures, or in the evolution of the scientific 
procedures and technology it employs. The conditions of the environment are mainly captured 
by the characteristics of the market and the region where the firm decides to be located. 
2. The resources the company allocates to engineering, design, research and marketing.  
These favourable conditions together with the company’s technical capacity need to be 
integrated within the framework of an innovative strategy in order that the following factors 
can be called into play:  
3. The company’s management and organisational structure.  
4. The company’s desire to differentiate its products or processes from those of its 
competitors.  
While many studies analyse specific factors that determine the company’s ability to patent 
very few incorporate variables related with the corporate governance characteristics.  
Aspects related to the ownership structure of the firm, such as the level of ownership 
concentration, the composition of the decision-making powers or the nature of this ownership, 
among others, have been avoided in the innovative literature so far. Although, there exist a 
number of papers that analyse the influence of some corporate governance variables on the 
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R&D investments (Hosono et al., 2004; Hill and Snell, 1988; Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2003), in 
our knowledge there are few works that explain the effect of some variables related with the 
management and the organisational and ownership structure on the firm innovative 
performance measured by patents.  
A few attempts in the literature try to explain this relationship focussing the attention to the 
information asymmetries between managers and owners in the firm decision-making process.  
On the one hand, the literature pointed that large shareholders have strong incentives in profit 
maximization and enough control over the assets of the firm to put pressure on managers to 
have their interest respected and risky projects maintained (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In the 
same line, some studies explain that the concentration of capital in a small number of owners 
helps to align the management team with the shareholders’ interests, leading to reducing high 
risk investment policies such as the ones of innovation, and to a loss of some of the benefits 
of specialisation (Hill and Snell, 1988; Burkart et al., 1997). The question to address from 
these studies is: has the concentration of the ownership in a few hands a direct impact of firm 
innovative performance? 
On the other hand, the incorporation of owners in the management positions and the 
composition of the boards of directors appear to be relevant in the process of resource 
allocation devoted to innovative activities. The entrepreneurship literature put emphasis in the 
role played by the entrepreneur, which most people recognize as meaning someone who 
organizes and assumes the risk of a business in return of the profits. In many cases (and in 
almost all large corporations), owners delegate decisions to salaried managers, and the 
question is: are independent directors better suited as decision-makers for innovative 
strategies than insiders?. The owners have appropriate information about firm’s activities and 
this is fruitful to enhance innovation, but in most cases, the innovative activities carry out 
“new combinations” by such things as introducing new products or processes, identifying new 
exports markets or sources of supply, or creating new types of organization and the owner 
needs judgment to deal with the novel situations connected with innovation (Casson, 1991; 
Crespi, 2004).  
Some others papers have focussed their research in the analysis of the effect of the nature of 
the ownership and the presence of outsiders on the innovative result. It is frequently argued 
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that branch plants have a relatively low level of autonomy with regard to major decisions. So, 
in the case of centralization of decisions within a foreign parent company, the implementation 
of innovations originating at the plant level is likely to be considered at a corporate rather than 
plant level (Bishop and Wiseman, 1999). Also, publicly-owned firms are characterized for 
developing a risk adverse competitive strategy in all the investments in which they are 
involved (Lafuente et al., 1985). In fact, the literature analysing the subject of ownership has 
provided interesting papers with the objective of studying the relationship between ownership 
and performance (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 
1999; Leech and Leahy, 1991; Mørck et al., 1988; Smith and Watts, 1992). The debate in the 
corporate governance literature goes back to Berle and Means (1932) with the suggestion of 
an inverse relation between the diffuseness of shareholdings and firm performance. 
Ownership structure thus seems to be an important issue when adopting risky decisions such 
as innovation investments. However, as far as we know, there is very little evidence 
concerning the role that may be played by a company's ownership structure on its innovative 
performance, and especially on its patenting activity.  
In this paper we analyse the impact that some internal and external variables may have on 
firm patenting activities. As regards to the internal characteristics of the firm, we focus our 
attention in the characteristics of the ownership structure, although we also control for the 
traditional ones (size, age and sector). Regarding the external characteristics of the firm, we 
focus our attention on the environment in which the firm is developing its activity. The 
environment can be characterized by the determinants of the market were the firm operates 
and the determinants of the region where the firm is located.  
On the one hand, the market where the firm is operating is determinant in characterising the 
innovative behaviour of the firms. Operating in highly competitive markets create a pushing 
effect that forces firms to secure their innovation from the competitors to maintain their 
market shares. The presence of Porter externalities, which are due to the fact that the firm is 
operating in a highly competitive and specialized environment, is higher in markets 
characterized by an international or global dimension.  
On the other hand, being located in a highly innovative region generates knowledge spillovers 
creating a favourable environment for innovation (Audretsch and Feldman, 1999 and 2005, 
Greunz, 2004 and van der Panne, 2004). The innovative regional dimension, captured by a 
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strong regional innovative intensity (by means of the presence of highly innovative inputs) or 
regional innovative performance (by means of a high innovation output per citizen), creates 
agglomerating forces and knowledge externalities exerting a positive impact in the firms 
operating in such regions (basically Marshall-Arrow-Romer -MAR- and Jacobs externalities). 
The accessibility to labour force or the industrial dynamicity generates agglomeration 
economies that influence positively the innovative behaviour of the located firms (Autant-
Bernard, 2001). The regional or local firms' competition for ideas, which are embodied in 
individual employees, is determined by industry-specific firm-employment ratio: the more 
firms per employee, the better individuals are enabled to pursue and implement new ideas due 
to a higher dynamicity in the area.  
Basically, we can summarize that this paper evaluates the influence of internal and external 
characteristics of the firm on the patenting activity in the context of a knowledge production 
function. The empirical analysis will be carried out for a sample of Spanish manufacturing 
firms from the period 1990-2002. Due to the lower share of firms that account patents in our 
sample, we decided to include the utility models or models of use, as an appropriate measure 
of the innovative activity of the firm in the same line than other authors (Beneito, 2006). 
Given the discreteness of the output variable, econometric models for count panel data are 
considered.  
The paper is structured as follows. After this introduction with a short review of the literature 
related to the subject, section two describes the methodology, discussing the advantages of the 
method of analysis chosen. Section three describes the data and the variables to be introduced 
in the analysis. We then describe the main results from our study in section five. Finally, 
section six concludes. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY  
The basic model considers patents as a function of contemporary and/or lagged flow of the 
firms’ R&D expenditures. In this paper we consider a group of determinants in the KPF such 
as the firm’s size and age, the technological opportunity and the competition level of the 
sector to which the firm belongs to, aspects related with the market and the location where the 
firm is operating as well as some additional ones related to the ownership concentration and 
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status of the firm. The usual way to deal with the discrete non-negative nature of the patent 
dependent variable is to consider a count data model, among which the most common is the 
Poisson regression model, in which the number of events, given a set of regressors x, has a 
Poisson distribution with parameters it where i indexes firms and t indexes time periods: 
   it2it10itit z)RDlog(expxexp   
so that  is the vector of parameters to be estimated, RD is the flow of R&D expenditures and 
z represents the other determinants of patents (for a short description of the variables see 
Table 1). We can use the time series dimension to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the 
cross sectional unit. A key advantage of longitudinal data over cross-sectional data is that it 
permits more general types of individual heterogeneity. The firm-specific term of either the 
random or fixed effect models proxy unobserved firm-specific propensity to patent.   
The application of the Poisson model requires equality of means and variance, which is not 
always met in practice. If the data show an excess of zeros, the standard errors of the Poisson 
model will be biased to the low end, giving spurious high values for the t statistics (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 1990). The most common formulation for taking into account this excess of zeros 
is the negative binomial model, which does not impose equidispersion in the dependent 
variable. This assumes that the variance is a quadratic function of the mean. We will estimate 
both type of models2.  
3. DATASET AND VARIABLES 
3.1. Dataset 
The database used is the Survey of Entrepreneurial Strategies (Encuesta sobre Estrategias 
Empresariales, henceforth ESEE) produced by the “Public Enterprise Foundation” of Spain 
for what is today the Ministry of Science and Technology (previously the Ministry of Industry 
and Energy). The Public Enterprise Foundation's Economic Research Programme designed 
the survey, supervises its annual production and maintains the database. The ESEE is a 
statistical research project that surveys a number of companies representing manufacturing 
industries in Spain on an annual basis. Its design is relatively flexible and it has two 
                                                 
2 Moreover we have estimated two more count data models, the Zero-inflated Poisson model and the Zero-
inflated Negative Binomial model for the pooled sample. The estimated results remain practically the same. 
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applications. On the one hand, it provides in-depth knowledge of the industrial sector's 
evolution over time by means of multiple data concerning business development and 
company decisions. The ESEE is also designed to generate microeconomic information that 
enables econometric models to be specified and tested. As far as its coverage is concerned, the 
reference population of the ESEE is companies with ten or more workers in what is usually 
known as manufacturing industry. The geographical area of reference is Spain, and the 
variables have a timescale of one year. One of the most outstanding characteristics of the 
ESEE is its high degree of representativeness. The ESEE contemplates the production activity 
of firms aggregated to a 2-digit level corresponding to the manufacturing sector. This 
aggregation in 20 industries corresponds to the NACE-CLIO3. 
[Insert table 1 around here] 
3.2. Internal firm characteristics 
As Beneito (2003) points out, the possibility offered by the ESEE of considering not only 
patents, but also utility models, is particularly important in a sample where the number of 
SMEs, as we will see later, is considerable. Large proportions of innovations in SMEs are 
incremental innovations and are not reflected as patents. However, the consideration of utility 
models may serve to compensate for this, as long as they are a means of protecting 
incremental innovations. Therefore, the number of patents and utility models obtained by a 
firm in the years under analysis is the dependent variable (PAT). A utility model can be seen 
as an exclusive right granted for an invention, which allows the holder to prevent others from 
using the protected invention commercially for a limited period of time, without 
authorization. The requirements for acquiring utility models are less stringent than for patents, 
their term of protection is shorter and they vary from country to country. Utility models are 
much cheaper to obtain and maintain, and finally, in some countries utility model protection 
can only be obtained in certain fields of technology and then only for products, not for 
processes.  
                                                 
3 NACE is a general industrial classification of economic activities within the European Union and CLIO is the 
Classification and Nomenclature of the Input-Output table. Both classifications are officially recognised by the 
Accounting Economic System (National Institute of Statistics INE: http://www.ine.es) 
 8
We include as firm innovative inputs the variable RD. It is constructed as the logarithm of the 
total R&D expenditures incurred by the firm in a given year. Thus, according with the 
literature, we can expect that as higher firm research and development expenses as higher the 
number of patents accounted by the firm. 
The variable SHARE reflects the effects of the mechanism that seeks to increase the 
concentration of ownership and so control managerial behaviour. This variable describes, 
therefore, the percentage of the company's share capital in the hands of the main shareholder4. 
A high concentration may act as a mechanism to relieve any agency problems arising from 
the lack of identity between ownership and control. However, a high degree of control 
wielded by the owners over the management team, owing to a high level of concentration, can 
lead to a reduction in the number of high-risk investments and, hence, fewer innovative 
activities. A number of studies conclude that while concentration may reduce the agency 
problem, it might also mean that the firm no longer enjoys the benefits of specialisation 
(Burkart et al., 1997; Hill and Snell, 1988).Therefore, the expected effect on patenting activity 
would be negative, because of the limited action of the managers in making high-risk 
decisions such as those involved in introducing innovative activities.  
The variable OWN, is the number of owners or family members holding management posts 
expressed as a percentage of the company's total staff as of 31 December in the years 
analysed5. This variable seeks to reflect how the appointment of owners to decision-making 
posts may alleviate problems associated with the separation of ownership and management 
functions. Such a separation has a series of advantages which businesses cannot ignore, in 
particular in terms of specialisation and the greater efficiency with which this endows the 
decision-making process. In the specific case of investment decisions, the effect of this 
separation of functions and the reduced specialisation of the management team can lead to 
cuts in investment for the development of activities related to a firm's growth opportunities, 
                                                 
4 The variable SHARE has been built using the information of the question survey "State whether other company 
or companies has a stake into the company's capital. If that was the case, please state the percentage owned by 
the company with the biggest stake". For the relative high values of the variable distribution the variable captures 
the concentration of the ownership in a more severe way, in the case of lower values it can be the case that the 
results appear a bit biased to the higher ones.  
5 The variable OWN has been constructed with the information of family members or relatives in managerial 
posts. The fact that a similar variable has been used in other studies for classifying family and non-family firms 
shows that the results of this particular variable will reflect mostly the problems of the identification of managers 
and owners in the case of Spanish business family firms (Ortega-Argilés, 2007).  
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which is the case of patent accounts. Therefore a negative effect of having owners in 
management positions is expected on the volume of patents acquired by the firm.   
Some other variables explaining the nature of the corporate ownership are included. On the 
one hand, the foreign ownership influence is explains by the dichotomous variable FOR, 
which takes the value of the unit when the firm has foreign ownership and a null value when 
the all the ownership is domestic. On the other hand, the effect of having public ownership is 
capture by the dichotomous variable PUB, which takes the value of the unit when the 
ownership of the firm is partially or totally public and a null value otherwise. These 
dichotomous variables have been used to analyse the cross-effects of the having a 
concentrated ownership or having owners in management positions and at the same time 
being partly or totally foreign or public company.  
The variables describing the company's internal structure include the variable SIZE, which 
shows the size of the business6 - the total number of personnel as of 31 December; and the 
variable AGE, which shows the company’s age or maturity - the number of years since the 
company was first founded. As regards the former, Schumpeter (1942) emphasised the 
positive influence of size on innovation, while a number of theoretical studies claim that 
larger companies have potentialities such as economies of scale, lower risk, a larger market 
and greater opportunities for appropriation (Fernández, 1996). However, empirical studies do 
not describe such a clear picture. So we find those that report a positive relationship between 
size and innovation (Scherer, 1992; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Love et al., 1990; Cohen and 
Kleeper, 1996; among others), and others that are unable to confirm this positive influence 
(Mansfield, 1964; Acs and Audretsch, 1991; among others, who report that small firms have 
an innovative advantage in highly innovative industries and in highly competitive markets). 
The age variable has also been widely studied as a determinant of a firm's innovative 
activities. A firm's age indicates the experience and knowledge that it has accumulated 
throughout its history and seems to be linked to a better management of its communication 
systems and of higher levels of the creativity needed to innovate, as well as to a more 
effective capacity to absorb (Galende and De la Fuente, 2003). The expected sign for the age 
variable, in line with the literature, is therefore positive.  
                                                 
6 Other variables such as total sales might also have been considered. In previous analyses we have observed that 
results remain the same regardless of the variable used to proxy firm size. 
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We have classified the firms into different categories depending on the technological 
opportunity of the sector to which they belong, since technological opportunity can be 
considered as being determined by the characteristics of the specific industrial sector. 
Variables of this type would seem to capture various dimensions of technology including 
technological opportunity, technology life-cycle, the necessity for complementary and 
specialised assets when implementing innovations and appropriability regimes (either by 
protection strategies of intellectual property rights as a barrier to entry, or by informal 
processes such as the first-mover advantage or a continuous implementation of innovation 
processes). Following Lafuente et al. (1985), the industrial sectors are classified here as 
presenting high, medium or low technological opportunities7. In order to avoid perfect 
multicollinearity, we have eliminated the middle category. Therefore, the variable HIGH is a 
dichotomous variable which takes the value 1 when the company belongs to a high 
technological opportunity sector of activity and 0 when it does not. We expect those 
companies belonging to high opportunity sectors to show greater innovative activity than 
those belonging to medium opportunity sectors. In some specifications of the model a set of 
two-digit dummy variables has been included to analyse in more detailed way how the 
technological opportunity may differ between different sectors of activity. 
Taking into account the effect that the environment in which the firm is operating can have on 
its capability to innovate, some variables are taken into consideration. Trying to capture the 
competitive environment where the firm operates, the variable MARKET has been included. 
This provides information concerning the geographical area of the main market. It is a 
dichotomous variable that classifies companies according to whether their market is greater 
than, or equal to, the national area. It takes the null value when it is smaller than the national 
area. This variable shows the effect on R&D activities of a company's decision to expand its 
                                                 
7 High technological opportunity sectors are: office machinery, computer processing, optical and similar 
equipment; chemical products; machinery and mechanical equipment; electrical and electronic machinery and 
material; motors and autos; other transport material, publishing and graphic arts. Medium sectors are: the meat 
industry; food and tobacco products; beverages; rubber and plastics; non-metallic mineral products; Metallurgy; 
metal products. Low sectors are: Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear, wood; Paper; Furniture and other 
manufacturing industries. (This classification has also been used in Lafuente et al., 1988 and Beneito, 2003, 
among others). 
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market to a larger geographical area, with an a priori expectation that firms with a larger main 
market carry out innovative activities with greater intensity8.  
 
3.3. Firm location determinants 
Finally, some additional variables have been constructed to complement the baseline model 
and capture the effects of firm location. The fact that the ESEE is not representative in a 
regional way, forces us to use another source of data for capturing the regional effects. We 
use the data for the Spanish National Statistical Institute (INE) and the Spanish Office of 
Patents and Trademarks.  
The dichotomous variable INNOVREG, which describes the innovative behaviour of the 
region in which the firm is located, places firms in one of two categories: the firms that are 
located in a region with technological opportunities (R&D expenses per employee) higher 
than the mean for the Spanish regions take the value 1, while those with a score lower than 
the mean take a value of 0. The regions that are considered as having the higher technological 
opportunity level in Spain are Catalonia, Madrid, Navarre, Valencia and the Basque Country. 
We expect the firms located in a region with high technological opportunities to have greater 
possibilities of obtaining R&D output.  
The variable EMPLREG is based on information from the Encuesta Industrial, and tries to 
pick up the effect of the agglomeration economies. It is constructed as the ratio of 
manufacturing employment in each region9 over the total manufacturing employment in Spain 
for the year under observation. This variable tries to capture the economic industrial 
dynamicity of the region, and will explain how the presence of MAR or Jacobs externalities 
coming from being situated in a region with high economic activity can influence the patent 
activity of the firm. The higher the ratio, the higher the accessibility to a better endowment of 
human capital and the industrial activity of the region. The hypothesis that can be tested is 
therefore that agglomeration economies incentive competiveness increasing the patentability 
of the firms located in such regions. 
                                                 
8 Several studies include factors related to the market characteristics in which a firm operates. See, for example, 
Blundell et al. (1999), Crépon et al. (1998), Kraft (1989), Licht and Zoz (1998), among others.  
9 The study considers as a region the so called Comunidades Autónomas.  
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The variable PATREG and RDREG capture the regional knowledge spillovers. The variable 
PATREG, one of the traditional proxies of regional absorptive capacities, is constructed as the 
number of the registered patents per resident in the region where each firm is located and 
shows the patentability effort of the region. A positive relation has been postulated between 
the absorptive capacity at the regional level and the innovative performance of the firms 
located in the region. The expected effect is that the innovative performance of the region 
causes a positive effect into the firms that are registered in such region.   
With regard to the variable RDREG, another traditional proxy of regional absorptive capacity, 
it captures the innovative effort of the region where the firm is located, and is constructed by 
the amount of R&D expenses of the region over the total amount of R&D expenses accounted 
in Spain during the year under consideration. In an intuitive way, we may think that the 
transformation of inputs into innovative outputs requires some time, which has motivated us 
to include the two-year lagged value of this variable. A positive effect of the innovative past 
R&D effort of the region is expected on the patentability activity of the firms located in it. 
Similar results was found by Bottazzi and Peri (2003) that demonstrate that increasing the 
R&D in one region is found to increase innovation output capture by patent applications. That 
R&D generates tacit knowledge not easily transferred over large distances is a common result 
in much of the empirical literature on knowledge spillovers (Jaffe, Trajtenberg and 
Henderson, 1993; Griffith, Harrison and Van Reenen, 2006; Griffith, Lee and Van Reenen, 
2007). 
In order to check the robustness of the model, some additional specifications have been 
checked, the inclusion of lagged values of the innovation input variable (RD-2), or the average 
of R&D expenditures in the last three years (RDMEAN) are some of them.  
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Table 2 gives some descriptive statistics regarding the main variables in our study.  
[Insert table 2 around here] 
As can be seen, the patent activity is not surprisingly higher in the Spanish manufacturing 
sector, less than 9% of the firms do patent. With respect to the R&D expenditures, only 
around 23% of the firms appear to invest in R&D. Regarding the previous two variables, it is 
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worthy to point out the huge overdispersion that account the two continuous variables based 
on patent and R&D information.  
Table 3 presents the estimation results for the KPF for our baseline specification. Special 
attention is paid to the firm internal ownership structure. Table 4 presents the estimation 
results distinguishing by technological opportunity of the sector. Table 5 presents the 
estimation results for the model including the regional context in which the firm is operating. 
Finally, table 5 includes as well some robustness checks with different specifications of the 
R&D input variable. All the tables include the results obtained with the estimation of a count-
data model using both the poisson and the negative binomial model, taking into account the 
over-dispersion in the dependent variable, the total number of patents and utility models that 
the firm accounts every year. Since we want to do inference on the population, the assumption 
of using the random-effects estimation when we are sampling on a larger population of firms 
seems reasonable since a random-effects specification assumes that individual specific 
constant terms are randomly distributed across cross-sectional units (Cameron and Trivedi, 
1998). This section will summarize the results focussing on the determinants that have been 
included in the different specifications of the model. 
The coefficients of current and lagged R&D expenditures are all significant and positive, 
although with a value which is slightly lower than those found in other empirical studies (see 
table 5 for the robustness checks in which different specification of the R&D effort have been 
taken into account). Regarding the firm internal determinants, firm size has the expected 
positive sign in all the specifications of the model, a result in line with the literature (Scherer, 
1965; Schumpeter, 1942; among others). The age of the firms appears to have a negative 
effect, the more mature is the firms the fewer patents it accounts; although when we run the 
analysis only for the firms belonging to high technological opportunity level (table 4) we 
found that the maturity of the firm can increase the chances of patenting. There seems to be 
learning by doing effect in these particular set of sectors. This can easily be explained by the 
fact that firms that are operating in these sectors have a more competitive environment and 
their innovations have to be protected in order to maintain their market share (table 4). As 
regards to the technological opportunity level of the sector of activity, firms belonging to 
high-tech sectors have a positive effect of accounting patents. These results are similar to 
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earlier reports for the Spanish case (Busom, 1993; Gumbau, 1997). Also as expected, the 
number of patents increases with the geographical extent of the market.  
[Insert table 3 around here]  
Concerning the variables regarding the ownership and management structure of the firm, we 
have found same results in the different specifications of the model. Mainly, ownership 
concentration presents a negative and significant effect, that is, the greater the concentration 
of capital in one person or group, the lower the volume of patents. Among other reasons, one 
may argue that closely-held firms could limit the action of the managers in risky decisions, 
moving the firm away from the benefits of specialisation. However, the effect of ownership 
concentration on patenting is not independent of its foreign or public nature. This is shown by 
the significant parameters of the multiplicative variables relating the concentration ownership 
and its status. Closely-held firms with foreign capital have an even lower propensity to patent 
than domestic firms. This could be explained by the fact that the patenting activity is 
generally taken by headquarters in the country of origin. On the contrary, state-owned firms 
are more innovative than privately-owned firms. A possible explanation has to do with the 
separation between the ownership and the management system, which tends to be very high in 
public firms, with the managers being less reluctant to be involved in innovation activities. 
Another possible explanation has to do with spin-offs from universities and technological and 
scientific parks, which tend to be public in Spain and of a high technological opportunity 
nature.  
The composition of the board of directors, measured by the percentage of owners in 
management position tasks over the total of the number of employees in the firm, seems to 
have a negative and significant parameter. As can be deduced from this result, the 
incorporation of owners in the firm decision- process might reduce the number of high-risk 
projects due to the lower specialisation of the owners in the patenting system and in the 
technical tasks.  
The public company’s effect is ambiguous. However, the negative effect of having foreign 
ownership could be explained by the fact that there is some evidence that branch plants tend 
to have relatively little R&D activity, and that this is often associated with the more routine 
development work rather than basic research (Howels, 1984). Indeed at the macro level the 
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theories of “endogenous” growth have stressed the importance of foreign direct investment as 
a vehicle for the import of superior technologies, techniques and business methods (Romer, 
1990).  
In the last columns of table 3 the NegBin model estimations are shown; this model 
generalizes the Poisson by allowing for an additional source of variance above that due to 
pure sampling error. Therefore, we have observed some differences in the sign and 
significance of the variables explaining the outcome of the innovation process on the type of 
model under estimation, either a Poisson or a NegBin. Econometrically, since our data show a 
clear overdispersion of zeros in the case of patents (the coefficient of overdispersion of the 
NegBin model is statistically significant), the second estimation model is pointed out as the 
most accurate, and therefore their results are the ones we prefer. The basic result of the 
NegBin models is that the patenting activity is explained by the effect of the R&D effort and 
the size like other papers explained. But the most interesting fact is that there are some 
variables that remain significant in the patentability activity of Spanish manufacturing firms. 
All in all, we obtain that the knowledge accumulation through R&D investments is the most 
important effect for the patenting activity in Spanish manufactures (with a higher elasticity 
than in the Poisson model), as well as the size of the firms, since the bigger the firm the more 
it patents. Additionally, once the overdispersion of the data is taken into account, the firms’ 
ownership still matters with diffusely-held firms patenting more than closely-held firms. This 
negative effect of ownership concentration is even increased in the case of foreign owned 
firms, which patent even less. Concerning the introduction of owners in the board of directors 
the same negative effect that the one obtained with the Poisson estimation is obtained, 
although now this effect is independent of the ownership structure. 
Following the idea pointed by Yafeh and Yosha (2003) that the volatility of results in the 
papers that studied the relationship between corporate governance and innovative strategy 
may rely first on sectoral and technological differences among other aspects like the regional 
differences (Lee and O’Neil, 2003; Lee, 2005), we have run the same regressions 
distinguishing between low-medium and high technological opportunity sectors (table 4).  
[Insert table 4 around here] 
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The main interesting finding in relation to corporate governance is that the variables proxying 
this issue are more significant in the high technological opportunity sectors, with the signs 
maintained as for the whole sample. Concerning the ownership variables, the concentration of 
the ownership and the inclusion of owners or relatives in management decision tasks seem to 
have the same negative effect in all the regressions. Only the composition of the board of 
directors seems not have the same important effect in the non-high tech firms as in the firms 
that belong to high-tech sectors, and the major cause is the lack of the knowledge in these 
types of activities as far as the owners and relatives concerns. An additional interesting 
finding is the contrary sign of the age variable in the two analysed sub-samples. This result 
underlines the existence of the necessity of a cumulative learning in the technological 
innovative activities like the evolutionary economics pointed (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 
1988; among others).  
4.1. The regional dimension 
Finally, taking into account the importance of the environment where the firm is operating we 
have introduced the regional component in some specifications of the model (table 5).  
[Insert table 5 around here] 
The results show that a firm's location is important for explaining the patent activity of 
Spanish manufacturing firms. The effect of the spatial distribution of technological 
opportunities in Spain has been analysed by González and Jaumandreu (1998) with similar 
conclusions being drawn. It seems that there is a positive effect on being located in an 
environment with highly innovative activity (table 5, column I, II and III). In other words, the 
fact of being located where there is a high innovative activity implies the existence of 
knowledge spillovers across individuals of different firms which would result in a higher 
patenting activity as other authors found (Audretsch and Feldman, 1999 and 2005; Greunz, 
2004 and van der Panne, 2004). The results show that the knowledge externalities arising 
from R&D activities feedback and looping relations among the individuals involved 
influencing the regional innovation creation. On the other hand, the presence of 
agglomeration economies coming from a dense labour market with a subsequent higher 
endowment of human capital (column IV) would also imply higher levels of innovation 
outputs. Thus our results are consistent with the literature that rely on knowledge-based 
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theories of endogenous growth, assuming that the density of economic activity facilitates 
face-to-face contacts and thus knowledge and idea flows either within (MAR externalities) or 
between (Jacobs externalities) industries. After controlling for overdispersion, knowledge 
spillovers and agglomeration economies seem to remain determinant in the patent activity of 
Spanish manufacturing firms. On one hand, having a geographical extent of the main market 
higher than the national one appears to favour accounting for patents. On the other, being 
located in a region with a highly innovative environment seems to encourage firm to patent.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The separation of ownership and management is one of the main reasons that cause agency 
problems in the investment decisions of the firm because of the informational asymmetries 
between managers and owners. In this study we have analysed the effect of some internal 
variables related with the firm ownership on its patenting activity. On one hand, we have 
considered those based on the concentration of the ownership, the inclusion of owners in the 
board of directors and the effect of the nature of the ownership (foreign and public). Taking 
into account the high difference between the sectoral aspects we have developed the analysis 
for two different groups of sectors according to their technological opportunity. The findings 
fit with the theoretical approach that the control of the decision of the management team by 
means of concentration of the ownership and introduction of owners in management positions 
tasks reduced the amount of innovations pursued by the firm probably due to the reduction of 
the specialization of the decision tasks and the adverse-risky innovative strategy.  
The first ownership characteristics considered in the study is the effect of the concentration of 
capital in a small number of owners. This mechanism has a range of associated disadvantages, 
related to the increased risk borne by the owners (due to the reduction in their number to 
obtain greater control levels), less liquidity in markets and fewer opportunities for negotiation 
of the company's values. As can be seen in our study, the concentration of the ownership does 
not favour the amount of output in innovation.  
With regards to the composition of the board of directors, measured by the share of owners in 
management and administration tasks with respect of the total amount of employees, we 
observe that the effect is negative in the majority of the analyzed regressions. The owners or 
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relatives could move the company away from the benefits of specialisation if the firm belongs 
to high-tech sectors because of the lack of expertise. Specialisation is often necessary, in order 
to have directors with the ability to administer complex organisational structures, diversify 
risk among shareholders and obtain large volumes of funds to acquire specific assets. 
Decreasing the divergences of interests because of an increase in the number of owners in 
management positions will make agency costs lower, but risky projects will not be adopted 
due to the failure to take advantage of specialisation or because there is a high degree of 
concentration of risk in the hands of a few owners. As shown in our results, an increase in the 
participation of owners in management positions has a negative impact on the total amount of 
patents and utility models awarded by the firm.  
Additionally, some other aspects regarding the environment where the firm is operating are 
also significant for explaining the patent activity in Spanish manufacturing firms. Operating 
in a global market has a positive influence, showing that the greater the market area, the more 
intense the competition will be. The presence of agglomeration economies as well as 
knowledge spillovers in the region where the firm is located appear to be an engine for 
encourage firm to do patents. Spatial concentration of individuals, capacities, information and 
knowledge within a limited geographic area provides an environment in which ideas flow 
quickly from person to person. Since dynamic externalities arise from communication 
between economic agents, their effects should be more important and observable via patents 
within an environment where communications are focused, which eases face-to-face contacts 
and thus the spillover of (tacit) knowledge and ideas. International competition or in a higher 
innovative environment are more diverse and intense than competition in smaller or lower 
innovative geographical areas, meaning that internal capabilities must be improved by 
adopting riskier patents in order to obtain a safe market share.  
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Table 1. Variables in the model 
Variables Description 
PAT Number of national patents, foreign patents and utility models 
RD
RD-2
RDMEAN
SIZE
AGE
SHARE
OWN
FOR
PUB
HIGH
SECTOR
MARKET
EMPLREG
INNOVREG
PATREG
RDREG
YEAR
R&D expenses (base=1992) in logs 
Two year lagged R&D expenses in logs 
Mean of the R&D expenses during the last three years in logs 
Number of employees (31st December) in logs 
Years since the company was first founded in logs 
Percentage of the company’s share capital in hands of the main 
shareholder
Percentage of the owners or relatives in management positions of 
the total number of employees 
1 for firms that have foreign capital; 0 otherwise 
1 for firms that have public or state capital; 0 otherwise 
1 for firms belonging to a high technological opportunity 
sector; 0 otherwise10
2-digit sectoral dummy variables 
1 for firms whose main market is the international one; 0 
otherwise
Ratio of the employment of the region over the total employment 
of Spain. 
1 for firms locating in a region with technological opportunity 
higher than the average level 
Number of registered patents per resident accounted in the 
region
Ratio of the R&D expenditures in the region over the total R&D 
investment in Spain 
Year dummies 
 
Table 2. Descriptive analysis 
Variables Mean Min Median Max Std. Dev. Share 
Diff. from 0 
PAT
RD
RDMEAN
SIZE
AGE
SHARE
OWN
0.6557
123918.8
3.1279
270
23
27.86
2.72133
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
47
25
0
0
500
1.40e+08
17.4767
25363
266
100
100
7.1390
1579794
5.2624
837
22
41.1956
5.4396
8.69
23.04
20.53
---
---
---
---
FOR
PUB
LOW
MED
HIGH
MARKET
SMALL 
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
21.29
5.54
26.31
36.72
36.18
7.46
69.43
 
                                                 
10 High technological opportunity sectors are: Office machinery, computers and optics; Chemical products; 
Mechanical equipment; Electronic machinery; Motors and autos; other transport material; Publishing and 
graphic arts. Medium sectors are: the meat industry; food and tobacco products; beverages; rubber and plastics; 
non-metallic mineral products; metallurgy; metal products. Low sectors are: textiles and clothing, leather and 
footwear, wood; paper; furniture and other manufacturing industries (this classification has also been used in 
Lafuente and Lecha 1988 and Beneito 2003, among others). 
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 Table 3. Estimation Results. Baseline Model.11 
 
 
 
 
 
Poisson Negative Binomial Variables I II III IV 
RD
SIZE
AGE
SHARE
SHARE*FOR
SHARE*PUB
OWN
OWN*FOR
OWN*PUB
HIGH
MARKET
Intercept
 
 
0.032***
(0.005)
0.605***
(0.040)
-0.135***
(0.028)
-0.002***
(0.001)
-0.006***
(0.010)
0.010***
(0.003)
----
----
----
0.609***
(0.134)
0.535***
(0.057)
-3.153***
(0.020)
15.565***
(0.821)
0.031***
(0.005)
0.666***
(0.041)
-0.146***
(0.027)
----
----
----
-0.029***
(0.010)
-0.281**
(0.142)
-0.811*
(0.431)
0.500***
(0.133)
0.620***
(0.051)
-3.485***
(0.196)
14.811***
(1.061)
0.118***
(0.009)
0.225***
(0.040)
-0.040
(0.042)
-0.002**
(0.001)
-0.004***
(0.001)
-0.003
(0.003)
----
----
----
0.097
(0.093)
0.159
(0.127)
-3.532***
(0.185)
0.113***
(0.009)
0.119***
(0.038)
-0.029
(0.041)
----
----
----
-0.030**
(0.014)
-0.060
(0.166)
0.042
(0.243)
0.094
(0.091)
0.210*
(0.121)
-3.037***
(0.194)
Wald test: 
Chi2(K-1)
N. Obs 
N. Indivs 
Log Likel: 
LR test =0;
chi2(1):
472.66***
8501
3417
-7018.18
25000***
561.23***
10114
3415
-8412.76
30000***
434.70***
8501
3417
-4315.71
311.75***
420.53***
10114
3415
-4913.32
543.57***
  
                                                 
11 The dependent variable is PAT, the number of patents and/or utility models awarded by the firm. In brackets 
the standard deviation is present. Moreover, *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% 
level. Estimations are made by maximum likelihood methods. 
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